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Abstract 
Performance measures such as alpha and the Sharpe ratio are typically 
based on sample returns net of fees. This implies the same weighting to 
sample returns and to fees. However, sample return parameters are noisy 
estimates of true parameters, while fees are known with certainty. Thus, 
intuition suggests that fees should be given more weight than sample 
returns. We formalize this intuition, and derive the optimal overweighting 
of fees. We show that the resulting generalized performance measures are 
better predictors of future net performance than the standard performance 
measures, and they better explain future fund flows.   
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 1. Introduction 
 As of mid-2016, about 44% of U.S. households own mutual funds. The 
investment in mutual funds represents on average approximately one-fifth of households’ 
financial assets.1 There are thousands of mutual funds in the U.S. market alone, with 
assets totaling roughly $18.5 trillion. Thus, selecting a mutual fund is an important and 
complex decision faced by millions of investors. 
 Two key inputs for this decision are the fund’s past performance and the fees it 
charges. Investors are, of course, interested in returns net of fees. Indeed, most reported 
performance measures are based on past net returns. This practice implicitly assigns the 
same weighting to sample gross returns and fees. For example, a fund with a gross 
sample alpha of 4% and fees of 3% has the same net alpha as a fund with a gross sample 
alpha of 2% and fees of 1%. However, there is a key difference between sample gross 
average returns (and other sample parameters) and fees: the sample returns are noisy 
estimates of the true parameters, while the fees are known with certainty.  
Fees should be weighed more heavily than the sample returns. All else equal, one should 
prefer the fund with a sample alpha of 2% and fees of 1% over the fund with sample 
alpha of 4% and fees of 3%, because the 2% difference in fees is known with certainty, 
while the 2% difference in sample gross alphas could very well be due to sampling error. 
Another way to state this is that the sample alpha should be shrunk (in the sense of Bayes, 
or James-Stein) to the cross-sectional grand average, but fees, which are known, should 
not be. Thus, in contrast to the common practice of employing net returns in evaluating 
performance, we argue that one should treat gross sample returns and fees separately. 
 The degree to which one should overweight fees relative to sample returns 
depends on the informativeness of the sample returns. On the one extreme, if the sample 
return parameters perfectly reflect the true parameters, they should be given the same 
weight as the fees. On the other extreme, if the sample parameters contain no information 
at all about the true returns, they should be completely ignored, and the decision should 
1 See “Ownership of Mutual Funds, Shareholder Sentiment, and Use of the Internet, 2016”, report by the 
Investment Company Institute, October 2016. 
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 be based on the fees alone. In general, the larger the sampling error, the more one should 
shrink the sample parameters, implying that the more one should overweight fees relative 
to the sample returns. The main contribution of this study is the derivation of the optimal 
over-weighting of fees relative to the sample returns. This derivation yields simple 
generalized performance measures that are easy to implement.  
 When a fund constitutes the investor’s entire risky investment, the relevant 
performance measure is the fund’s Sharpe ratio. When an investor holds a fund as a part 
of a larger risky portfolio, the relevant performance measure is the fund’s alpha with 
respect to the investor’s entire portfolio.2 Another well-known portfolio performance 
measure that has recently regained attention (Lo, Orr, and Zhang 2017, Levy 2017) is the 
geometric mean. The logic for overweighting fees applies to all three of these 
performance measures. We introduce the Generalized Sharpe ratio (GS), Generalized 
alpha (Galpha), and the Generalized Geometric Mean (GGM) as modifications of the 
standard performance measures that incorporate the optimal overweighting of fees. 
 The proposed generalized performance measures have bearing on one of the most 
central issues in the vast mutual fund literature: the persistence of performance. Most of 
the literature on performance persistence employs past performance and fund 
characteristics, fees typically among them, to predict future performance. Some of these 
studies find significant performance persistence (Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks, 
Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann 
(1995), Wermers (1996), Elton, Gruber, Das and Blake (1996), Kosowski, Timmerman, 
Wermers, and White (2006), Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010)). Others either don’t 
find persistence (Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1969)), or argue that after including the 
appropriate controls for momentum (Carhart (1997)), or the Fama-French (2015) 
profitability and investment factors, this persistence vanishes (Jordan and Riley 2015).   
The present study contributes to this literature in two ways. First, while the above 
literature is empirically-driven, our analysis is theoretically-driven, and yields analytical 
2 Levy and Roll (2015) argue that even in this case, alpha is appropriate only if the investor considers 
infinitesimal adjustments to his portfolio. Otherwise, tilting the portfolio towards assets with positive 
alphas (and away from assets with negative alphas) is not very helpful, and one can do much better by 
constrained optimization on the assets’ weights. 
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 formulas for the generalized performance measures. Second, while studies that include 
fees as explanatory variables almost all find a negative coefficient for fees,3 these cross-
sectional regressions assign a single fee coefficient to all funds. In contrast, we argue that 
the optimal over-weighting of fees relative to the sample returns generally depends on 
fund-specifics, such as the number of return observations and the volatility of sample 
returns: the smaller the number of observations, and the higher the sample volatility, the 
more one should overweight fees. 
 
2. Generalized Performance Measures 
 
The basic idea underlying our generalized measures is that sample parameters should 
be shrunk towards their population means, but the fees are known, and should therefore 
be taken as is. This implies an under-weighting of the sample parameters relative to fees, 
or equivalently, an overweighting of the fees. 
 
2.1 Generalized Alphas  
Consider an investor who is interested in choosing the fund with maximal alpha net of 
fees. Alpha could be Jensen’s (1969) original CAPM alpha, or the alpha with respect to 
any other factor model. For each fund i, the investor observes iN  independent sample  
observations, tiα , with a sample average iαˆ . These alphas are gross of fees. We assume 
that the tiα ’s of fund i are drawn from a normal distribution with a known standard 
deviation of iσ , but an unknown mean, which is the fund’s true population iα (in 
practical and empirical applications iσ  will be estimated by its sample value iσˆ ).  The 
true α ’s are assumed to be distributed normally with mean αµ  and standard deviation 
ασ . The fees of fund i are known and denoted by iFee , and they represent a fixed 
percentage of assets under management.  
3 See Sheng, Simutin, and Zhang (2017) for a recent exception. 
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 The standard practice is to rank funds by their sample alphas net of fees, i.e. by: 
          ii Fee−αˆ .                (1) 
However, choosing a fund by this ranking does not yield the maximal expected ex-ante 
net alpha. Given a fund with gross sample alpha iαˆ , the expected ex-ante gross alpha is:  
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This is a straightforward application of Bayes Theorem (see, for example, eq.(24) in 
Murphy 2007). The expectation is “shrunk” towards the mean population alpha of αµ .4 
Funds should be ranked by their expected net alphas, i.e. by the expected gross alpha 
given above, minus fees, which we define as the generalized alpha: 
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Notice that this implies that the sample alpha is under-weighed relative to the fees (or 
conversely, the fees are overweighed relative to the sample alpha): the sample alpha is 
replaced by a weighted average of the sample alpha and the average alpha. In the extreme 
case where the estimation error, 
i
i
N
2σ , is very large relative to the variation in the 
population alphas, 2ασ , the  sample alpha is completely ignored, and only the fees are 
taken into account. On the other extreme, if the estimation error is very small, the fraction 
in (3) converges to the sample alpha, and the standard net alpha (1)is obtained as a 
4 If the parameters ,, αα σµ  and iσ are unknown, one can use the James-Stein (1956, 1961) shrinkage 
estimator, which converges to the Bayes estimator when the number of funds is large. 
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 special case. In general, the larger the estimation error and the lower the variation in the 
population alphas, the more the sample iαˆ  should be under-weighed relative to the fees. 
Empirically, we find that shrinking the alphas to zero or alternatively to the cross-
sectional mean yield almost the same results.  
 
2.2 Generalized Sharpe Ratio 
Consider an investor who is interested in maximizing expected return for a given 
level of standard deviation, i.e. an investor who seeks to maximize the portfolio’s Sharpe 
ratio. We make the following assumptions: 
1. Investors can borrow and lend at the risk-free rate. 
2. Investors know the true standard deviation iσ  for each fund, but not the mean 
return. (In practical and empirical applications iσ  will be estimated by its sample 
value iσˆ ). 
3. The true Sharpe ratios (gross of fees) are distributed normally across funds with 
mean Sµ  and standard deviation Sσ . 
4. Fund i has known and fixed fees iFee , which represents a fixed percentage of 
assets under management. 
 
All returns are denoted in excess of the risk-free rate. The investor observes N  
independent gross return observations for each fund. Fund i has a sample mean return iµˆ , 
The investor wishes to hold a portfolio with a standard deviation of 0σ . This can be 
accomplished by leveraging (or unleveraging) holdings in the selected fund to obtain a 
portfolio with the desired standard deviation 0σ . The investor’s goal is to choose the 
fund that maximizes expected return, net of fees, given the standard deviation of 0σ . The 
value of 0σ  is arbitrary, as will become evident in what follows. If fund i is selected, the 
investor will invest a proportion 
i
x
σ
σ 0=  of wealth in the fund (and a proportion x−1  in 
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 the risk-free asset), so that the portfolio will have the desired level of risk 0σ . This 
leveraged portfolio’s sample gross mean is i
i
i µσ
σ
µ ˆˆ 0* = (recall that returns are in excess 
of the risk-free rate), and its standard deviation is 0
* σσ =i , where the superscripts * 
indicate the parameters of the levered portfolio. The fees the investor will pay on this 
portfolio are i
i
i FeeFee σ
σ 0* =  (for example, if the investor places $50 in the risk-free 
asset and $50 in a fund that charges fees of iFee =1% of assets under management, the 
fees of $0.5, are 0.5% of the total portfolio, i.e. %5.0* =iFee ). 
What is the expected net return for this portfolio? Let us first calculate the 
expected gross return, and then subtract the fees. Again, the expected ex-ante return 
should be shrunk toward the population average.5 The standard error in estimating iµ  is 
N
iσ . For *iµ  the standard error is therefore NNN
x i
i
i 00 σσ
σ
σσ
=⋅=⋅ . As the true 
Sharpe ratios are distributed normally across funds, with mean Sµ  and standard deviation 
Sσ , for portfolios with standard deviation 0σ , the population means are  distributed 
normally with mean Sµσ 0 and standard deviation Sσσ 0 . Thus, employing Bayes’ rule, 
just as in the previous section, for a portfolio with sample gross mean *ˆ iµ  the expected 
gross ex-ante return is given by:     
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5 Technically, the shrinkage should be done only when comparing three or more funds (in conformity to 
the James-Stein method.) 
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 In this case the shrinkage of *ˆ iµ  is towards the mean expected return across all portfolios 
with standard deviation 0σ , i.e. towards Sµσ 0 . The expected net return is: 
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In terms of the parameters of the original unlevered fund, the expected net return is: 
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Note that the second term is just a constant that is the same for all funds, and it is 
therefore irrelevant for the ranking of funds, and can thus be ignored.6 Similarly, the term 
0σ  that multiplies all terms is irrelevant for the ranking. Thus, funds should be ranked by 
the following Generalized Sharpe ratio: 
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This is very similar to the standard Sharpe ratio, except for the term 
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multiplying the sample mean iµˆ  (recall that returns are in excess of the risk free rate, i.e. 
the standard Sharpe ratio is: 
i
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ˆ
). This term is smaller than 1, implying the 
under-weighting of the sample mean relative to the known fees. If the number of 
observations, N, or the variation in the true Sharpe ratios across funds, Sσ , become very 
large, then the Generalized Sharpe ratio converges to the standard Sharpe ratio. 
6 In the case that the number of return observations is different across funds, this term is no longer constant, 
and the generalized Sharpe ratio becomes: S
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2.3  Generalized Geometric Mean 
Choosing the fund with the highest geometric mean (GM) has been suggested 
decades ago as the “growth optimum” strategy that over the long run almost surely yields 
a higher terminal wealth than investment in any other fund (Kelly 1956, Latane 1959, 
Markowitz 1976). Recently, Levy (2017) suggests that the GM provides a very good 
measure of portfolio performance, even if the horizon is not long. He shows that in a 
realistic setting with limited borrowing the GM yields a ranking of funds that is more 
aligned with investors’ expected utilities than the alignment obtained when ranking funds 
by the Sharpe ratio or by alpha. This is true for a wide range of preferences, and for 
horizon as short as one month. Another advantage of the GM as a performance measure 
is that while the ranking of funds by alphas or by Sharpe ratios may change with the 
investment horizon, even if returns are i.i.d, (Levy 1972, Levhari and Levy 1977), the 
ranking by the GM is invariant to the investment horizon. Thus, it is of interest to develop 
the generalized GM performance measure. 
Consider an investor who is focused on maximizing her portfolio’s geometric 
mean, net of fees. Assume that the total returns of fund i, gross of fees, grossiR , are 
distributed log-normally, i.e. ( ) ( )igrossigrossi gNR σ,~~log , and R=1+gross rate of return. 
Note that the log of the gross geometric mean is ( )( ) ( )grossigrossigrossi GMREg log~log == . 
We assume that the true log-gross-geometric-mean, grossg  , is distributed normally 
across funds, with mean gµ  and standard deviation gσ . The investor does not know the 
true parameter grossig , but observes iN  gross return observations for fund i, with a 
sample gross log-geometric-mean ( )∑
=
−=
iN
j
jtgross
i
i
gross
i RN
g
1
,log1ˆ , where t is the current 
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 time, and jtgrossiR
−,   indicates the gross total return of fund i at time t-j. As before, it is 
assumed that iσ  is known (and estimated by iσˆ  in practical applications). 
The fees are known. In the present context it is convenient to denote the fees in terms 
of the assets under management at the end of the period, such that: 
( )igrossineti FeeRR −⋅= 1 .7 This implies that:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )igrossineti FeeGMGM −−= 1logloglog , or: 
 ( )igrossineti Feegg −−= 1log .       (8) 
We assume that the investor is interested in selecting the fund that has the maximal 
expected value of netg , i.e. the fund that has the highest expected log(GM), net of fees. 
 The standard error in the estimation of grossigˆ  is 
i
i
N
σ
. The standard deviation of 
the true values of grossg  across the population of funds is distributed normally with mean 
gµ  and standard deviation gσ . Thus, given the observation 
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igˆ , by Bayes’ rule the 
expected ex-ante grossig  is given by: 
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The Generalized Geometric Mean (GGM) is given by the expected net g , i.e. by: 
 
7 This definition is slightly different than the one used in the previous sections, where it is assumed that the 
fees are in terms of the assets under management at the  beginning of the period, i.e. that 
i
gross
i
net
i FeeRR −= . However, for practical purposes both definitions are very similar. For example, if 
one invests $100,  the gross return is 5%, and the fees are 2%, if these fees are defined in terms of the assets 
in the beginning of the period, the net end-of-period value is $100(1.05-0.02)=$103. If, alternatively, the 
fees are defined in terms of the assets of the end of the period, the net end-of-period value is $100(1.05(1-
0.02))=$102.9. 
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 (10) 
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As in the case of the generalized alpha and the generalized Sharpe ratio, here too, the 
observation of grossigˆ  is underweighted relative to the fees: 
gross
igˆ  is shrunk towards the 
population mean gµ , while the known fees are taken as is. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Data 
Our data are from the CRSP survivorship-bias-free mutual fund data set. We 
employ domestic U.S. equity funds. We include only funds with total net asset value 
exceeding $20 million, and investment of between 70% to 130% of the fund’s assets in 
common equity. As total net assets (needed for calculating fund flows) are reported 
monthly on a regular basis since 1992, we employ the January 1992 – December 2016 
sample period. 
3.2 Prediction of Future Performance 
The preceding theoretical analysis suggests that the generalized performance 
measures are better estimates of the funds’ true performance than the standard measures. 
In order to examine this empirically, we analyze the correlation between in-sample 
performance and out-of-sample performance as a function of the under-weighting. Note 
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 that the under-weighting of the sample parameters depends on ασ , Sσ  and gσ , which 
are generally unknown. Our analysis allows us to empirically find the under-weighting 
that works best. We take an in-sample period of 36 months, and an out-of-sample period 
of the next 36 months. The out-of-sample performance is calculated from the out-of-
sample net returns. The in-sample performance is calculated by the generalized 
performance measures (eq. 3, with mean alpha assumed to be zero, 7 and 11), for 
different values of the under-weighting of the sample parameters. 
Figure 1 shows this relation for alphas. ασ  determines the under-weighting of the 
sample alpha. 0/1 =ασ  ( ∞=ασ ) implies no shrinking of the sample alpha at all – in 
this case the generalized alpha reduces to the standard alpha calculated with net returns. 
The other extreme of ∞=ασ/1  ( 0=ασ ) implies shrinking all sample alphas to zero, 
i.e. ranking funds only according to their fees. Figure 1 shows the correlation between the 
in-sample generalized alpha and the out-of-sample alpha as a function of ασ/1 . The 
three panels correspond to three different versions of alpha: A: CAPM alpha, B: Four-
Factor alpha (the 3 Fama-French factors + momentum), and C: alphas of the Fama-
French (2015) Five-Factor model. 
In all three cases the generalized alphas offer an improvement over their standard 
counterparts. For the CAPM alpha, the highest correlation is obtained for a value of  
approximately 100/1 =CAPMασ , i.e. 01.0=
CAPM
ασ .  This value implies that for a typical 
fund with a standard deviation of monthly returns, iσ of, say, 5%, the sample alpha is 
under-weighed by a factor of 0.59, because eq.(3) becomes: 
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For a less volatile fund, with monthly iσ of 3%, the under-weighting is by a factor of 
0.8: 
 iiiiii
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For the Five-Factor alpha the maximal correlation is obtained for 125/1 5 =Fασ , implying 
more under-weighting. For instance, for a fund with %5=iσ  the sample alpha is under-
weighed by a factor of 0.48. For the Four-Factor alpha one should apply even more 
under-weighting. In this case the maximal correlation is obtained for a value of 
approximately 180/1 4 =Fασ , implying that for a fund with %5=iσ the sample alpha is 
under-weighed by a factor of 0.31. 
 When considering the Sharpe ratio and the GM, the correlation between the in-
sample standard measure (with no under-weighting) and the out-of-sample measure in 
our sample turns out to be negative (-0.37 in the case of the Sharpe ratio, and -0.45 in the 
case of the GM). These negative correlations are likely due to the negative correlation of 
the average market returns over the same period – in our sample the correlation between 
the average monthly return on the market in a 36-month period and the average return in 
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 the next 36-month period is -0.36). This problem does not affect the alphas, as they 
control for the market factor. The negative correlations imply a corner solution – ignore 
the sample measures altogether and rank funds only according to their fees. However, we 
believe that this situation may be rather specific to the sample period employed. 
Unfortunately, the sample period cannot be changed much due to the availability fee data, 
and negative correlations also appear when other reasonable horizons are employed 
instead of 36 months. Thus, to estimate the optimal under-weighting for the Sharpe ratio 
and the GM we take a modified approach.  
 Every month, we sort funds into 100 groups, sorted by their in-sample generalized 
performance. Thus, the composition of these 100 groups generally changes from month 
to month. For each of the groups, we calculate the average in-sample generalized 
performance over the preceding 36 months, and the average out-of-sample net 
performance over the next 36 months. The averaging is across all funds in the group at a 
given month, and across all months in the sample, i.e. for each one of the 100 groups we 
have one in-sample average performance, and one out-of-sample average performance. 
The averaging across time neutralizes the negative correlation problem, yet still allows us 
to maintain the relation between in-sample and out-of-sample performance. This analysis 
is conducted for different levels of under-weighting of the sample parameters, and we 
examine the correlation as a function of the under-weighting. Figure 2 shows the results: 
Panel A corresponds to the Sharpe ratio, and Panel B to the geometric mean. 
 For the Sharpe ratio, the correlation is maximized at the value of 16/1 =Sσ , or 
0625.0=Sσ .  This value of Sσ is much larger than the typical value of ασ (for the 
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 CAPM alpha, the maximal correlation is obtained for 01.0=CAPMασ ). This is reasonable, 
as the monthly alphas are in the order of a few percent, while the monthly Sharpe ratio is 
in the order of about 0.2. For N=36 months, this value implies an under-weighting of the 
sample mean by a factor of about 0.12 (see eq.7). This rather dramatic under-weighting 
conforms with the notorious difficulty of estimating mean returns. 
 The Generalized Geometric Mean (GGM) requires two global parameters: the 
mean and standard deviation of the log(GM), gµ  and gσ , respectively (see eq. 11). For  
gµ  we take the average in our sample, which is 0.0064. We then examine the correlation 
between the in-sample GGM and the out-of-sample GM as a function of gσ . The 
maximal correlation is obtained for a value of about 120/1 =gσ , or 0083.0=gσ . This 
value is similar to those obtained for alphas. For a typical fund with %5=iσ , it implies 
that the gross sample grossigˆ  is shrunk toward the average gµ  as: 
( ) ( ) g
gross
ig
gross
i gg µµ ⋅+⋅=





⋅+
+





⋅+
5.0ˆ5.0
05.0/0083.0361
1ˆ
0083.036/05.01
1
2222 . 
 
 
 
3.3 Fund Flows 
It has been well-documented that fund flows react to past performance (Chevalier and 
Ellison 1997, Elton, Gruber, and Busse 2004, Barber, Odean, and Zheng 2005, Spiegel 
and Zhang 2013, and Fulkerson and Riley 2016). If investors intuitively understand that 
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 fees should be weighed more heavily than sample parameters, we would expect flows to 
be more closely related to the generalized performance measures than to their standard 
counterparts. The purpose of this section is to examine this question empirically.  
Fund flows are calculated as usual: 
( )
1,
1,1,,
,
1
−
−− +−=
ti
tititi
ti TNA
rTNATNA
Flow ,     (12) 
where tiTNA , denotes the total net assets of fund i at time t, and tir ,  is the fund's rate of 
return between time t-1 and t. 
We regress the fund flow at time t on the fund’s past performance measure (PPM) 
during the period (t-T, t-1). Fund performance is taken either the standard measure (alpha, 
Sharpe, GM), net of fees, or the corresponding generalized measure (Galpha, GS, GGM). 
For alphas, we examine all three versions: CAPM alpha, Four-factor alpha, and Five-
Factor alpha. Specifically, we run the regression: 
ti
K
k
kiktTtiti controlcPPMbaFlow ,
1
,1:,, ε+⋅+⋅+= ∑
=
−−    (13) 
We use the following controls: the standard deviation of monthly returns over  (t-T, t-1), 
log(fund size), fund age (in years), manager tenure (in years), and turnover. The in-
sample period is taken, as before, as 36 months (T=36), and the flow is measured over the 
next month. For the generalized performance measures, we take the optimal under-
weighting as found in the preceding section. 
The results are given in Table 1. Note that the generalized performance measures are 
typically smaller than their standard counterparts, because of the shrinkage, and therefore, 
their coefficients (and standard errors) are larger. The more relevant results are their 
15 
 
 significance (t-values, given in parentheses). In all cases, the generalized performance 
measure is more significant than its standard counterpart. This suggests that investors do 
indeed realize that fees should be overweighed relative to the sample parameters, and are 
more sensitive to the generalized performance measures than to the standard measures.   
 
4. Conclusions 
An effective tool for fund selection is of great importance to investors. In practice, 
virtually all performance measures are based on past returns. As investors are 
interested in returns net of fees, the standard practice is to calculate performance 
measures based on past net returns. This implicitly assigns the same weight to past 
returns and to fees: a fund with a gross sample average return of 4% and fees of 3% 
has the same net average return as a fund with a gross sample average return of 2% 
and fees of 1%.  
The point of this paper is very simple: past returns and fees should be treated 
differently: past returns are noisy estimates and should be “shrunk” to the cross-
sectional average, while fees are known with certainty, and should be taken as is. This 
implies that fees should be weighed more heavily than past returns. This study 
formalizes this idea, and captures it by suggesting generalizations of the three main 
portfolio performance measures: alpha, the Sharpe ratio, and the geometric mean. 
These generalized performance measures better predict future performance, and 
thus constitute an improvement over the standard measures. Furthermore, future fund 
flows are better explained by the generalized performance measures than by their 
standard counterparts, suggesting that investors intuitively understand that fees should 
16 
 
 be overweighed relative to sample returns. It is our hope that the simple generalized 
performance measures suggested here will be adopted by investors and by fund rating 
agencies, as superior alternatives to the standard measures currently employed. 
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 Table 1 
Fund flow at time t  is regressed on the fund past performance during the period (t-T, t-1). As fund past performance measure (PPM) 
we take either the standard measures (alpha, Sharpe, geometric mean), net of fees, or the corresponding generalized measures, Galpha, 
GS, GGM, as given by equations 3,  7, and 11. We regress: 
ti
K
k
kiktTtiti controlcbPPMaFlow ,
1
,1:,, ε+⋅++= ∑
=
−−  
The following controls are employed: the standard deviation of monthly returns over (t-T, t-1), log(fund size), fund age (in years), 
manager tenure (in years), and turnover. The in-sample period is taken as 36 months (T=36), and the flow is measured over the next 
month. For the generalized performance measures, we take the optimal under-weighting as reported is Section 3.2. Numbers in 
parentheses are the t-values. ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Performance 
measure: 
Sharpe Ratio CAPM α Four-Factor α Five Factor α Geometric Mean 
Standard SR Generalized SR Standard α 
Generalized 
α Standard α 
Generalized 
α Standard α 
Generalized 
α 
Standard 
GM 
Generalized 
GM 
constant 1.17 (3.08***) 
1.54 
(4.40***) 
1.41 
(4.05***) 
1.44 
(4.13***) 
1.44 
(4.15***) 
1.50 
(4.29***) 
1.43 
(4.30***) 
1.57 
(4.46***) 
1.25 
(3.46***) 
1.12 
(2.93***) 
Past 
performance 
measure 
0.63 
(1.72) 
7.87 
(3.11***) 
22.83 
(1.62) 
74.41 
(2.15**) 
16.05 
(0.97) 
68.79 
(1.70) 
30.76 
(2.18**) 
92.48 
(2.54**) 
20.48 
(1.93) 
33.29 
(2.00**) 
σ 14.19 (1.92) 
10.30 
(1.46) 
12.82 
(1.78) 
14.18 
(1.95) 
11.14 
(1.57) 
11.90 
(1.67) 
10.58 
(1.57) 
11.66 
(1.64) 
11.37 
(1.61) 
13.02 
(1.81) 
Log(TNA) -0.29 (-7.69***) 
-0.32 
(-8.12***) 
-0.30 
(-7.70***) 
-0.30 
(-7.83***) 
-0.29 
(-7.60***) 
-0.30 
(-7.73***) 
-0.29 
(-7.79***) 
-0.31 
(-7.91***) 
-0.30 
(-7.73***) 
-0.30 
(-7.76***) 
Fund age 0.003 (0.62) 
0.004 
(0.67) 
0.004 
(0.69) 
0.004 
(0.73) 
0.004 
(0.65) 
0.004 
(0.69) 
0.004 
(0.71) 
0.004 
(0.71) 
0.004 
(0.66) 
0.004 
(0.66) 
Manager 
Tenure 
0.001 
(0.13) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
0.002 
(0.23) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
0.002 
(0.20) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
Turnover -0.24 (-2.35**) 
-0.21 
(-2.01**) 
-0.26 
(-2.46**) 
-0.25 
(-2.40**) 
-0.26 
(-2.47**) 
-0.25 
(-2.42**) 
-0.25 
(-2.54**) 
-0.26 
(-2.49**) 
-0.25 
(-2.45**) 
-0.25 
(-2.42**) 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1: The correlation between in-sample generalized alpha and the out-of-sample net 
alpha as a function of the amount of shrinkage, as measured by ασ/1 .  We examine this 
relation for three versions of alpha: CAPM alpha (Panel A), Four-Factor alpha (Panel B), 
and the recently suggested Five-Factor alpha (Panel C). ασ/1 =0 implies no shrinkage at 
all, i.e. the generalized alphas reduce to the standard alphas. 
 
 
  
Figure 2: The correlation between in-sample generalized performance measures and the 
out-of-sample performance as a function of the amount of shrinkage, as measured by 
Sσ/1  in the case of the generalized Sharpe ratio (eq. 7), shown in Panel A, and by gσ/1  
in the case of the generalized geometric mean (eq. 11), shown in Panel B.  σ/1 =0 
implies no shrinkage at all, i.e. the generalized measure reduces to the standard 
performance measure. 
 
 
 
 
